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Abstract
This article explores the effect of remittances on the prevalence and intensity
of child labor in Bolivia. Using household survey data, we find that children in
remittance-receiving households are less likely to be actively supplying labor,
and the number of hours worked per week declines with the size of remittances
received. The size of the impact varies between urban and rural households.
Remittances to urban households have a larger impact on moving children
completely out of the labor force, but a smaller increase in remittance size is needed
for an equal reduction in number of hours worked in rural areas.
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1 Introduction
Remittances to Bolivia have grown from US$7.4 million in 1995 to US$1.2 billion in
2013 (World Bank 2015). This tremendous growth has led to remittances being an
increasingly important part of the Bolivian economy. Personal remittances to Bolivia
have totaled as much as the equivalent of 8.04 % of GDP (see Fig. 1). Despite the
sizable role remittances are now playing in the Bolivian economy, surprisingly little
research has looked at the impacts remittances are having in that country. The few
studies that do exist have found evidence that some Bolivian households are effectively
using remittances as part of an income diversification strategy to overcome insurance
and capital market imperfections (Alcala et al. 2014) and that remittances are helping
to reduce poverty in urban areas (Lopez-Videla and Machuca 2014). The present study
adds to the small, but important, body of research related to Bolivian remittances by
exploring the relationship between remittance receipt and the use of child labor in
Bolivia. While the relationship between remittances and child labor has been studied
for other countries (see below), this relationship is of particular importance in the
Bolivian context, since in July of 2014 lawmakers took the unprecedented step of
lowering the legal working age in Bolivia from the minimum age of 14 established by
international labor conventions to 12 years old for formal contracted employment and
10 years old for self-employment (Watson 2014). Ostensibly, the government argued
that since they were essentially powerless to prevent the need for child labor among
impoverished households, the change in the law was necessary in order to afford legal
protections to children who would have been working anyway. However, it is possible
that the Bolivian government has yet to exhaust all of its available resources. This
study explores the relationship between remittances and child labor, and the potential
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for utilizing remittance income to reduce the prevalence and intensity of child labor.
The results presented below suggest that the government may have given up too soon
and that remittances might prove to be an effective tool in the fight against child labor
in Bolivia.
2 Background
Bolivia experienced a dramatic increase in out-migration during the 1980s, coinciding
with the period of hyperinflation that occurred from 1984–1985. Between 1980 and
1990, the number of Bolivians living abroad grew by 36 % (see Table 1). A stagnant
economy in the 1990s only saw the rate of emigration grow. Between 1990 and 2000,
the number of Bolivians living abroad grew by 60 %, then nearly doubled again in the
following decade. By 2010 nearly 700,000 Bolivian citizens, 6.9 % of the population,
were living outside of the country (World Bank 2011, 2015). Along with the growth in
migration came an even larger growth in remittance transfers. Between 1995 and 2013,
annual remittance flows grew by approximately 16,000 %, giving Bolivia one of
the fastest remittance growth rates in the world. Remittance flows grew fastest in
the 5 years leading up to the Great Recession in 2008 (see Fig. 1). Although they
declined in the 2 years following the global financial crisis, by 2013 they were
back above their pre-recession level.
The period corresponding to the Great Recession also saw a dramatic decline in chil-
dren’s schooling in Bolivia. This trend, however, did not bounce back to pre-crisis
levels. Between 2006 and 2013, the number of out-of-school children increased from
40,640 to 169,291. Net primary school enrollments fell from 95.57 % to 87.73 %
Fig. 1 Remittances to Bolivia 1995–2013. Data Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015
Table 1 Bolivian population living abroad
Year 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Emigrant population 120,536 139,100 166,734 226,404 361,475 684,998
Growth rate (%) – 15.4 19.9 35.8 59.7 89.5
Share of population (%) 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.3 4.3 6.9
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Global Bilateral Migration Database (World Bank 2011) and World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2015)
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(UNESCO 2015). While this drop is itself substantial, it is likely that certain groups
within the country were affected disproportionately. Despite a 1994 Educational Reform
Law that proclaimed the government was duty-bound to offer free universal education
and provide education to indigenous populations in their native languages, disparities
in educational attainment still persist between rich and poor, and Spanish and
indigenous-language speakers (ILO-IPEC 2012, Reimáo and Taş 2015). Furthermore,
net enrollment rates are not necessarily reflective of the true state of education, as they
do not account for children who are enrolled in school, but may not attend regularly,
or the quality of the education they receive. Many children enrolled in school opt not
to go because they must travel large distances, and those who do go to school often
arrive to find schools with inadequate supplies (ILO-IPEC 2012).
Although complete data are unavailable for the corresponding period, it is likely that
the change in school attendance during this time is correlated with an increase in child
labor activity. While the vast majority of Bolivian children are enrolled in school, most of
them also split their time between school and work. Despite ratifying several International
Labor Organization conventions on child labor, many children in Bolivia are engaged in
some form of economic activity. A 2012 report on child labor and education in Bolivia,
which analyzed data from the 2008 Survey of Child Labor (Encuesta de Trabajo Infantil),
found that only 14.8 % of children aged 6–13 reported school attendance as their only
activity. Most children reported some combination of schooling and work, either paid or
unpaid, with 1.3 % reporting devoting time to both school and paid work, 61.5 % report-
ing going to school and contributing unpaid household labor, and 20.9 % reporting a
combination of the three (ILO-IPEC 2012). This rate of labor participation is largely
unchanged from its 2001 levels (Zapata et al. 2011). Much like educational access, child
labor activity is also disproportionately distributed among certain groups. Older children
are more likely to work than younger children, indigenous children are more likely to
work than non-indigenous children, and children in rural households are more likely to
work than children in urban households (ILO-IPEC/INE 2010).
While many countries saw their economies shrink during the Great Recession, Bolivia
did not slip into a recession itself, although its growth rate did decline somewhat
(World Bank 2015), so changes in the local economy are unlikely to explain any ob-
served changes in school attendance and child labor activity. But Bolivia did see a de-
cline in remittance income. Given remittances’ important role in the Bolivian economy,
it is possible that the decline in remittance flows that occurred during this period con-
tributed to an increase in child labor and, therefore, indirectly to a decline in school
enrollment. This relationship will ultimately depend on how individual households are
affected by remittances, and whether remittances contribute to a reduction in child
labor. This study explores the relationship between remittances and child labor at the
household level to determine the extent to which changes in remittance income
contribute to changes in child labor.
Several recent studies have examined the ability of remittances to reduce child labor.
To the extent that child labor is largely driven by extreme poverty (Basu and Van
1998), it follows that if remittances can help lift households above some minimum
income threshold, then they should help to alleviate the need for children to work.
Furthermore, Epstein and Kahana (2008) propose that out-migration of working-aged
adults can serve to raise wages in the home country, vis-à-vis a decrease in the supply
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of labor, thus reducing the need for child labor by increasing non-remittance income as
well. Additionally, remittances can mitigate financial shocks which might otherwise
require children to enter the workforce (Beegle et al. 2003).
In general, the existing empirical literature supports the argument that remittances
reduce the supply of child labor. In a cross-country study of 82 countries, Ebeke (2010)
finds significant evidence that an increase in remittances as a share of GDP is associ-
ated with a reduction of the share of the 10–14-year-old population actively engaged in
work. His study also finds that remittances have a stronger effect on the reduction of
child labor in countries where credit constraints are higher and GDP growth more
volatile, indicating that remittances help insure against negative income shocks that
can contribute to the need for children to help supplement household income. Several
country-level studies also find evidence that remittances can reduce the need for child
labor. Acosta (2011) finds that remittance receipt significantly reduces the likelihood
that children will engage in paid labor in El Salvador. Alcaraz et al. (2012) find a signifi-
cant increase in the prevalence of child labor in Mexico following the decline in remit-
tances resulting from the 2008 US financial crisis. Dimova et al. (2015) find evidence
that migrant transfers reduce the supply of child labor in Tanzania. The underlying as-
sumption in all of these studies is that remittances help reduce liquidity constraints
and increase household income sufficiently to reduce the need for child labor.
Not all studies find uniformly positive results, however. For example, while Acosta
(2011) does find that remittances are associated with a decrease in wage labor, he also
finds that remittances tend to increase the prevalence of domestic labor, suggesting that
remittances simply lead to a reallocation of child labor from paid to unpaid work. Simi-
larly, in the case of El Salvador, Calero et al. (2009) find that remittances only reduce
the incidence of paid child labor among rural and non-poor households and that remit-
tances increase the incidence of domestic labor in urban households. These studies
suggest that while increased income vis-à-vis remittances may benefit the household,
disruption caused by the loss of a working-aged household member to migration may
have negative impacts on the children left behind. Other studies have found similar
effects with respect to investment in children’s human capital. Bansak and Chezum
(2009) examine the effects of migration and remittances on children’s schooling in
Nepal. Their findings indicate that an increase in net remittance income increases the
probability that young children are in school. However, they also find that increasing
the number of absentee adults significantly reduces the probability of being in school
for children of all ages. Similarly, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008) examine the differing
effects of remittances when they are received by an immediate member of the house-
hold versus when they are received by extended family or friends. They find that in
certain Haitian communities, remittances only have a positive effect on children’s
schooling when they are received from extended family or friends, rather than house-
hold members who have migrated. That is, the disruption caused by losing a household
member to out-migration diminishes any benefits gained from receiving remittances.
In addition to contributing to the body of research specific to Bolivia, this study also
contributes to the broader literature pertaining to remittances and child labor. With
the exception of Dimova et al. (2015), all of the empirical studies mentioned above
measure the effects of remittances on child labor at the extensive margins, i.e., whether
a child works or not. While this is indeed an important point, it may underestimate the
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full impact of remittances. For instance, if we wish to curtail child labor so that chil-
dren may attend school, then a significant reduction in the number of hours worked
may have a larger impact than moving a child at the margins completely out of the
labor force. Thus, it is important to look beyond the incidence of child labor and exam-
ine remittance income’s effect on the intensity of child labor as well. Similarly, Acosta
(2011) and Alcaraz et al. (2012) both estimate their models with binary indicators for
remittance receipt. This, too, may be misrepresenting the true impact of remittances,
as remittance size can vary widely across households. Furthermore, from a policy stand-
point, it is important to differentiate between the potential impacts of increasing the
share of households receiving remittances (i.e., encouraging more migration) and
adopting policies to increase the flows of remittances to households that already have a
member abroad. This study addresses these issues by analyzing the relationship between
the size of remittance income and the number of hours worked by children in the
household, in addition to the relationship between remittance receipt and the
prevalence of child labor.
3 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework for this analysis builds off of the model proposed by Basu
and Van (1998), extended to include remittance income in the household budget
constraint. Parents maximize utility with respect to consumption and their children’s
leisure. Children’s leisure is considered a luxury good, and only enters the parent’s
utility function once some minimum subsistence level has been achieved. The parent’s
preferences are expressed by the Stone-Geary utility function
u c; eð Þ ¼ c−sð Þ 1−eð Þ if c≥s
c−s if c < s

ð1Þ
where c is the parent’s consumption, e is each child’s labor effort level, and e ∈ [0, 1].
The minimum subsistence level, s, is a parameter.
The household’s budget constraint is
ncþmβc ¼ mewc þ nwa þ r ð2Þ
where n(≥1) is the number of adults in the household, m(≥1) is the number of children
in the household, each child consumes β(< 1) share of what an adult consumes, wa and
wc are the wages
1 paid to adults and children, respectively, and r is the remittance
income.
Solving this model for the case where c ≥ s gives the optimal allocation of children’s
effort as
e  wa;wc;m; n; rð Þ ¼
0
1
if s nþmβð Þ þmwc≤nwa þ r
if s nþmβð Þ−mwc≥nwa þ r































¼ n wa−sð Þ þ r−smβ
2mw2c
ð8Þ
Equations 4 and 5 show child labor decreases with an increase in adult wages and re-
mittance income. However, remittance receipt is more complex than just a change in
non-labor household income, since migration necessarily requires removing at least
one member from the household to go abroad, i.e., a decrease in n. Equation 6 gives
the change in optimal child labor effort with respect to the number of adults in the
household. This implies that when the adult wage is less than the minimum subsistence
level, migration will lead to a decrease in child labor and when the adult wage is greater
than the minimum subsistence level migration leads to an increase in child labor, be-
fore accounting for any change in remittance income. Combining this with the fact that
child effort is decreasing in r means that in the case where adult wages are less than
the subsistence level of consumption, migration and remittances unambiguously reduce
child effort. Furthermore, a large enough increase in remittance income that leads to
the case where s(n +mβ) +mwc ≤mwa + nwa + r yields the corner solution of e = 0,
thereby moving a child completely out of the labor market. On the other hand, when
adult wages are greater than the subsistence level of consumption, migration and remit-
tances reduce child effort only if r > (wa − s). That is, if remittances are insufficiently
small, such that they do not offset the loss of the adult wage due to migration, then
migration can increase child labor. Intuitively, we would expect that a rational, utility
maximizing household would not send a member abroad in this case unless they
expected remittance income to offset the loss of domestic income. However, since the
realized income may differ from the expected income, it is possible that migration may
indeed lead to an increase in child labor effort. Thus, ex ante it is uncertain whether
remittances will reduce child labor on average.
Equation 7 gives the change in child labor effort with respect to an increase in
the number of children. Child labor is increasing in the number of children when
sn < nwa + r. That is, in households where the adult income exceeds subsistence, increasing
the number of children increases child labor effort. While this may seem counterintuitive at
first glance, recall from Eq. 3, if sn + smβ +wmc ≤ nwa + r, then we reach the corner solution
where e = 0. As such, the result form Eq. 7 only holds if sn < nwa + r < sn + smβ +mwc. This
would imply that although more children might necessitate an increase in child labor,
this need can be offset by an increase in income. Therefore, we can potentially expect
to see both child labor and remittances increase with respect to the number of
children in the household.
Finally, Eq. 8 indicates that there are both income and substitution effects determining
the child labor supply. When total child subsistence, smβ, exceeds adult surplus income,
(wa − s)n + r, child labor is decreasing with an increase in the child wage. Thus, when less
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labor is needed to meet the subsistence need, less labor is supplied. However, when adult
surplus income exceeds the child subsistence level, child labor is increasing in child wages.
Thus, children can be enticed back into the workforce by increasing the wage. However, this
result also only holds for the special case where sn + smβ < nwa + r < sn + smb +mwc,
otherwise we reach the corner solution of no child labor effort.
4 Empirical strategy
This study addresses two general empirical questions. First, are children in households
that receive remittances more or less likely to work? Second, how does the size of the
remittances received by the households affect the number of hours worked by children?
The first question is addressed by estimating the effects of remittance receipt on child
labor at the extensive margins. That is, remittance receipt and labor supply are mea-
sured using indicator variables equal to one if the household receives any positive
amount of remittance income and if the child worked at least 1 h in any labor activity.
This approach is consistent with the previous literature which investigates how remit-
tance receipt influences the propensity for children to work. To address the second
question, the effects are then estimated at the intensive margins, replacing the indicator
variables used in the first model with measures of the total number of hours a child
works and the amount of remittance income the household receives, both measured on
a weekly basis. Both models are estimated first on the entire sample. The models are
also estimated separately for urban and rural households, as well as for male and female
children in order to explore any potential heterogeneity between these groups.
In both models, endogeneity is likely to lead to biased results. If the decision to mi-
grate and send remittances is part of a household’s income diversification strategy, then
many of the factors contributing to this decision (both observed and unobserved) will
also influence the decision over whether and how much children in the household will
work, leading to problems with simultaneity bias. To control for potential endogeneity
issues, the models are estimated using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy. Given
the nature of the model, finding an instrument that affects the size of remittances being
sent without directly affecting the number of hours worked by children in the house-
hold can be challenging. The instrument chosen to predict the incidence and size of
remittances received by the household is the existence of migration networks, which is
an instrument commonly employed in the migration and remittance literature (Alcala
et al. 2014, Acosta et al. 2008, Acosta 2011, Calero et al. 2009). In particular, the share
of households receiving remittances in the household’s geographical department is used
as a proxy for migrant networks. Migrant networks are useful instruments because
such networks can reduce the costs of migration and improve employment opportun-
ities in the destination countries. Thus, they can affect both the decision to migrate
and the size of remittances being sent, without necessarily being correlated with the
unobserved factors influencing labor supply decisions by the household receiving the
remittances. It is expected that reduced costs of migration, as indicated by a larger mi-
grant network, will lead to an increase in both the likelihood that a household receives
remittances and the size of the remittances received. Aggregate measures, such as share
of households receiving remittances, are also useful as instruments because they are
less susceptible to issues of reverse causality. That is, the aggregate measure will impact
the household’s decisions, but the individual household is too small relative to the rest
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of the population to affect the aggregate measure in any meaningful way. On the other
hand, aggregate measures do not allow for the possibility that the presence of migrant
networks may affect households differently, depending on their ability to access them.
To account for this, an interaction term between remittance receipt at the department
level and a household wealth index is also included. Inclusion of household wealth
allows for the fact that international migration can be quite costly, so wealthier house-
holds will be in a better position to take advantage of the presence of migrant networks
than poor households.
The general model is:
Lij ¼ β1X þ δRj þ ∈1ij; ð9Þ
Rj ¼ β2X þΦZ þ ∈2ij ð10Þ
where Lij is a labor supply variable pertaining to child i in household j, and Rj is a vari-
able related to remittances received by household j. X is a vector of individual and
household characteristics, and Z is a vector of instruments. Individual characteristics of
the children include age and gender. Household characteristics are per capita monthly
income, a wealth index2, an indicator of whether the household is below the poverty
line, the number of children across various age/gender dimensions, age, gender, and
marital status of the household head, highest education level in the household, and
whether Spanish is the first language of any household member.
In the first part of the analysis, both Lij and Rj are indicators equal to one if the child
works and the household receives remittances, such that
Lij ¼ 1 if Lij > 0




Rj ¼ 1 if Rj > 0
Rj ¼ 0 if Rj ¼ 0

ð12Þ
where Lij is the observed number of hours worked by child i in household j, and R

j is
the observed value of remittances received by household j.
As Acosta (2011) points out, there are several methods available for analyzing models
with binary endogenous and outcome variables. There is also some debate on which of
these methods is preferred. Angrist (2001) suggests that a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) linear probability model is sufficient if the intent is to identify causality. 2SLS
has the added benefit of providing an easy method for assessing instrument validity.
On the other hand, 2SLS also has a number of shortcomings with binary endogenous
and outcome variables. First, predicted values in linear probability models are not
bound within the unit interval. This can contribute to heteroscedasticity in single-
equation models and lead to “awkward” interpretations of conditional probabilities
(Wooldridge 2002, p. 455). Additionally, as Moffitt (2001) and Wooldridge (2002) indi-
cate, neglecting to control for non-linearity in the first stage of the linear probability
model can lead to inconsistent estimates in the second stage. Another method, which
controls for nonlinearities, is the bivariate probit model developed by Heckman (1978).
The bivariate probit model eliminates the problems associated with non-linearity in the
two equations. However, identification in the bivariate probit model requires stronger
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assumptions than 2SLS, most notably the exclusion restriction, which assumes that the
instruments only affect the outcome variable via the treatment variable (Angrist et al.
1996). Despite both models having strengths and weaknesses, Chiburis et al. (2012) find
that the bivariate probit model tends to perform better than 2SLS when there are con-
tinuous covariates, sample size is less than 5000, and treatment probability is close to 0
or 1. In the analysis below, both models are estimated. However, since these conditions
outlined by Chiburis et al. (2012) closely align with the data used in this study, the
bivariate probit is the preferred model for this study.
In the second part of the analysis, the indicator variables for remittances and labor
supply are replaced by the natural logs of the observed values plus one, such that
Eqs. 11 and 12 become
Lij ¼ ln Lij þ 1
 
if Lij > 0




Rj ¼ ln Rj þ 1
 
if Rj > 0
Rj ¼ ln 1ð Þ ¼ 0 if Rj ¼ 0
(
ð14Þ
In addition to the endogeneity issues mentioned above, another source of potential
bias in the second model comes from the fact that 75.9 % of children in the sample re-
ported working zero hours. If a significant share of the observed zero values occurred
due to unemployment, rather than choosing not to participate in the labor force, then
this variable is censored at zero and OLS estimates of Eq. 9 will lead estimates being
biased toward zero (Greene 2011). Similarly, since only 8.4 % of households report re-
ceiving remittances, Eq. 10 is also subject to censoring at zero. In a single-equation
model, this source of bias is typically corrected for with the use of a Tobit model
(Tobin 1958). Given that endogeneity is still an issue, the model is again estimated
through the use of instrumental variables. A standard IV Tobit model, however,
assumes an uncensored continuous variable in the first-stage regression. Thus, to
control for censoring in both equations, the model is estimated using a bivariate
Tobit model. The bivariate Tobit model is not widely used in the economics
literature, but it has been shown to be particularly useful in cases where the
dependent variables may be jointly determined (Yoo 2005, Rahman 2014), as is
the case in the present study.
5 Data
Data for this analysis are from the 2011 Survey of Bolivian Households (Encuesta de
Hogares Bolivia). The survey, conducted by the Bolivian National Statistics Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de Bolivia), is a sample of 33,821 individuals living in
8851 households and is weighted to be nationally representative. The survey covers a
wide range of economic and demographic characteristics of the household and its
members. Most importantly for this analysis, the survey documents the labor activity
and income sources, including remittance income, of all household members over the
age of 7. For the purpose of this study, the analysis is restricted to include only children
under the age of 14, which was the legal working age at the time of the survey.3 The
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survey contains data on 5351 children between the ages of 7 and 13. Table 2 presents
summary statistics of selected key variables. Labor activity is determined by a series of
questions asking if they were employed, worked growing food or raising animals,
helped with a family business, worked as a street vendor, or engaged in any other activ-
ity which earned money for at least 1 h in the previous week, or had a job, but did not
work in the previous week because of vacation, illness, or other various reasons. Thus,
the measure of labor activity used includes both employment in the formal and infor-
mal labor markets, as well as unpaid domestic labor, such as farming. 24.1 % of chil-
dren aged 7 to 13 reported being engaged in at least 1 h of labor activity.4 The children
who work reported working an average of 23.8 h per week. These numbers vary widely
between urban and rural households, however. In rural households, 49.9 % of children
aged 7–13 reported working at least 1 h per week, whereas 7.7 % of children in urban
households reported working. On the other hand, working children in urban house-
holds work more hours per week, on average, than working children in rural house-
holds, with the former reporting an average of 24.7 h and the latter 18.8 h per week.
Table 3 gives the distribution of child labor activity by type of work at the national
level and by urban and rural households. Nationwide, 76.5 % of working children are
employed in agriculture. This is largely driven by the fact that child labor is much more
prevalent in the rural areas, and agriculture makes up 92.7 % of the work done by chil-
dren in rural areas, compared to only 11 % in urban areas. Agricultural work done by
children includes preparing the land for planting, harvesting crops, tending to livestock,
and other jobs typical to farming. The largest category of activity among urban children
is sales jobs. Sales jobs can include being employed as a cashier, working in a family
run store, or working as a street vendor. 39.3 % of urban child labor is sales, while this
only makes up 3.6 % of child labor in rural areas. The sales category excludes the sale
of prepared food, which is included in the food service category. Food service also
includes working at a food stand or restaurant in any capacity, whether it is in sales,
cooking, or washing dishes. Food sales constitute 26.8 % of child labor in urban areas,
and 2 % in rural areas. The next largest category of job in urban areas is working
in the skilled trades, such as construction, carpentry, or mechanic/auto body. This
makes up 6.4 % of child labor activity in urban areas. Children working in these
areas typically report being “assistants” and doing ancillary jobs such as cleaning
tools and mixing paint. This type of work is not a significant component of rural
labor activity. Other jobs which are more common in urban areas, but not significant in
rural areas, include light manufacturing or making of artisanal crafts, child care, and
housekeeping/domestic work.
Overall, 8.4 % of the children in the sample live in households that report receiving
remittances. This is slightly higher among urban households (9.5 %) than rural house-
holds (6.7 %). A similar pattern holds for size of remittances. The median remittance-
receiving household receives 466 bolivianos, approximately US$675, per week. In rural
areas, the median remittance-receiving household receives 233 bolivianos (US$34) per
week, whereas the median urban household receives 699 bolivianos (US$101) per week.
Across the entire sample, children in remittance-receiving households are slightly less
likely to work than children in households not receiving remittances, at 19.7 and
24.5 %, respectively. This difference persists in urban households, but the propensity to
work is very similar between the two groups in rural households.
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Table 2 Selected Summary Statistics, survey-weighted mean values for children ages 7–13
Full sample Rural households Urban households
All households Remittances No remittances All households Remittances No remittances All households Remittances No remittances
Child works 0.241 0.197 0.245 0.499 0.508 0.498 0.077 0.059 0.079
(0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.013) (0.046) (0.013) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
Hours worked per week if hours >0 20.01 17.92 20.16 18.8 18.1 18.9 24.74 17.35 25.31
(0.49) (1.22) (0.51) (0.50) (1.34) (0.53) (1.31) (2.92) (1.38)
HH receives remittances 0.084 0.067 0.095
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 10.07 10.16 10.06 9.98 10.10 9.97 10.12 10.19 10.11
(0.030) (0.098) (0.031) (0.050) (0.183) (0.052) (0.037) (0.115) (0.039)
Male 0.523 0.529 0.523 0.531 0.506 0.533 0.518 0.539 0.516
(0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.013) (0.046) (0.013) (0.009) (0.031) (0.010)
Household income per capita (Bs/m) 711.67 868.49 697.25 439.37 541.44 432.09 884.49 1013.30 870.90
(10.83) (36.96) (11.30) (14.78) (74.51) (14.89) (14.12) (40.70) (15.00)
Poverty indicator 0.586 0.463 0.597 0.714 0.617 0.721 0.504 0.395 0.515
(0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.012) (0.047) (0.012) (0.009) (0.031) (0.010)
Rural 0.388 0.307 0.396
(0.008) (0.024) (0.008)
HH age 42.56 46.90 42.16 42.85 48.53 42.45 42.38 46.18 41.98
(0.17) (0.69) (0.17) (0.28) (1.30) (0.28) (0.21) (0.82) (0.21)
HH female 0.184 0.337 0.170 0.146 0.291 0.135 0.208 0.357 0.192
(0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.010) (0.042) (0.010) (0.008) (0.030) (0.008)
HH married 0.594 0.509 0.602 0.628 0.566 0.633 0.573 0.484 0.582












Table 2 Selected Summary Statistics, survey-weighted mean values for children ages 7–13 (Continued)
Max education 10.59 11.42 10.52 8.29 9.31 8.22 12.06 12.35 12.03
(0.060) (0.190) (0.063) (0.082) (0.281) (0.085) (0.071) (0.226) (0.074)
Children 0–5 0.68 0.60 0.69 0.87 0.68 0.88 0.56 0.56 0.56
(0.013) (0.043) (0.014) (0.024) (0.087) (0.025) (0.014) (0.048) (0.015)
Boys 6–17 1.33 1.27 1.34 1.52 1.37 1.54 1.21 1.23 1.21
(0.016) (0.051) (0.017) (0.030) (0.091) (0.031) (0.018) (0.061) (0.019)
Girls 6–17 1.25 1.28 1.25 1.35 1.28 1.35 1.19 1.28 1.18
(0.015) (0.050) (0.015) (0.025) (0.085) (0.026) (0.018) (0.061) (0.019)
Spanish first language 0.84 0.88 0.83 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.98 0.99 0.98
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.012) (0.043) (0.013) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
Number 5351 447 4904 2036 149 1887 3315 298 3017












Remittance-receiving households tend to have higher incomes and are less likely to
be below the poverty line. The household heads are more likely to be female and less
likely to be married. The household is also more likely to have higher levels of education
and more likely to speak Spanish as their first language. These patterns are consistent
between rural and urban households.
6 Results
6.1 Propensity to work
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates of Eq. 9 for all children aged 7–13, where child
labor and remittance receipt are measured as indicator variables equal to one for any
non-zero value. Columns 1 and 3 report the naïve OLS and probit models, which do
not control for any potential endogeneity biases. Both coefficients for remittance re-
ceipt are positive, but not significant. Column 2 presents the results of the two-stage
linear probability model. The remittance coefficient is negative and highly significant,
indicating that OLS estimates are biased toward zero, which is consistent with results
found by previous studies (Acosta 2011; Alcaraz et al. 2012). As noted above, an advan-
tage of 2SLS is the ability to test for instrument validity. Results of Hansen’s J test of
over-identifying restrictions are presented at the bottom of column 2. With a p value of
0.3767, the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. Further-
more, in Table 5, column 1 presents the first-stage estimates of the 2SLS model. Both
of the instruments are positive and highly significant. This result is consistent with the
hypotheses that reduced costs of migration, as measured by larger migrant networks,
increase the probability that households receive remittances and that wealthier house-
holds are better positioned to leverage these networks. Additionally, propensity to re-
ceive remittances is significantly higher for households with female heads and increases
with the age of the household head. Also, recall that the theoretical model above sug-
gested that remittances may increase when there are more children present in the
household. The results in Table 5 indicate that households with more adolescent girls
are more likely to receive remittances; however, the effect of an increase in adolescent
boys or children under the age of 5 is not significant.
Unfortunately, since expected values of dependent variables in linear probability
models are not bounded between zero and one, the usefulness of the linear probability
Table 3 Child employment by industry
All children Rural Urban
Agriculture 0.7654 0.9271 0.1095
(0.0133) (0.0100) (0.0206)
Sales 0.1062 0.0356 0.3926
(0.0096) (0.0072) (0.0331)
Food service 0.0691 0.0201 0.2677
(0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0300)
Skilled trades 0.0137 0.0013 0.0642
(0.0040) (0.0013) (0.0189)
Other 0.0456 0.0159 0.1660
(0.0067) (0.0051) (0.0250)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Industry shares are calculated using probability weights
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model can often be limited to addressing the direction of causality and testing instru-
ment validity. Indeed, in the present model, the coefficient of −0.68 is much too large
to be realistic, since it implies remittance receipt would place the predicted probability
of working well below zero for a significant share of the sample. Thus, as mentioned
Table 4 Estimation results of propensity to work, children aged 7–13
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS Probit Bivariate probit
Remittance indicator 0.0028 −0.6828*** 0.00003 −0.9281***
(0.0181) (0.1718) (0.0891) (0.2780)
Age 0.0272*** 0.0276*** 0.1288*** 0.1243***
(0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Male 0.0331* 0.0419** 0.1302* 0.1373*
(0.0144) (0.0162) (0.0624) (0.0611)
Household income per capita 0.00002* 0.000002 0.0001* 0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Poverty indicator 0.0105 −0.0062 0.0024 −0.0289
(0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0698) (0.0692)
Rural 0.2506*** 0.2558*** 0.9312*** 0.8955***
(0.0182) (0.0202) (0.0650) (0.0677)
HH age 0.0002 0.0022** −0.0003 0.0027
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0023) (0.0024)
HH female −0.0012 0.0511* 0.0073 0.0889
(0.0156) (0.0214) (0.0720) (0.0751)
HH married 0.0347** 0.0219 0.1362* 0.1098*
(0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0566) (0.0555)
Max education −0.0014 −0.0016 −0.0166 −0.0163*
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0085) (0.0083)
Children 0–5 −0.0026 0.0043 −0.0085 0.0037
(0.0076) (0.0084) (0.0309) (0.0305)
Boys 6–17 0.0048 0.0054 0.0330 0.0341
(0.0074) (0.0081) (0.0290) (0.0284)
Girls 6–17 0.0193** 0.0267*** 0.0944*** 0.1023***
(0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0276) (0.0271)
Spanish first language −0.2813*** −0.2908*** −0.7366*** −0.7313***
(0.0232) (0.0247) (0.0702) (0.0699)
Wealth index −0.0215*** −0.0129* −0.0889*** −0.0735***
(0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0176) (0.0184)
Constant 0.0113 −0.0196 −2.1979*** −2.1552***
(0.0502) (0.0558) (0.2114) (0.2103)
Number 5351 5351 5351 5351
F 120.47 102.64
χ2 1148.50 1512.71
Hansen’s J statistic 0.7816
p value 0.3767
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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above, the preferred model for this analysis is the bivariate probit model, the results
of which are presented in column 4. Again, the coefficient for remittance receipt is
negative and highly significant. In Table 5, it can be seen that the signs and signifi-
cance of the variables determining remittance receipt are consistent with those of the
2SLS model.







Household income per capita −2.25e−6 −3.8e−5
(8.18e−6) (4.75e−5)




HH age 0.0029*** 0.0166***
(0.0005) (0.0024)
HH female 0.073*** 0.4038***
(0.0135) (0.0697)
HH married −0.0168 −0.0870
(0.009) (0.0645)
Max education 0.0003 0.0042
(0.0014) (0.0095)
Children 0–5 0.009 0.0435
(0.005) (0.0355)
Boys 6–17 −0.0002 0.0026
(0.004) (0.0321)
Girls 6–17 0.0108* 0.0804*
(0.0049) (0.0323)
Spanish first language −0.0074 −0.0321
(0.0122) (0.0943)
Wealth index −0.0167*** −0.1085*
(0.0057) (0.0462)








Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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While the interpretation of coefficient estimates obtained by the bivariate probit
model are not as straight forward as those obtained by 2SLS, estimates of causal treat-
ment effects can be recovered using the predicted values (Angrist et al. 1996). Average
treatment effects (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for the
bivariate probit models are estimated using the method proposed by Nichols (2011).
The ATE is estimated as the mean of the difference between the predicted probability
that a child works when Rj = 1, and the predicted probability when Rj = 0, with other
covariates held at their observed values. The ATT is estimated as the mean difference
in predicted probabilities conditional on the child living in a household that receives re-
mittances. The effects of remittance receipt corresponding to the results in Tables 4 and 5
are presented in the first row of Table 6. These results indicate that remittances receipt is
expected to reduce the likelihood a child works by an average of 16.6 % among all house-
holds, and by 25.5 % among the subgroup of remittance-receiving households.
There are also a number of other noteworthy results among the control variables in
Tables 4. As was seen in the summary statistics, children in rural households are sig-
nificantly more likely to work than their urban counterparts, and boys are more likely
to work than girls. The propensity to work increases with the child’s age, and children
in households where Spanish is the first language are significantly less likely to work
than children in households with an indigenous first language. In addition to acting as
a proxy for a household’s ethnicity, the primary language spoken also serves as an indi-
cator for economic opportunity. Although Bolivia has 35 officially recognized languages
(Taylor 2004), Spanish is the traditional language of the elite class and also the most
common shared language between groups. As such, poor Spanish skills can lead to eco-
nomic exclusion of the parents, thus increasing the need for children to help supple-
ment income. Furthermore, although the Education Reform Bill of 1994 called for
education to be provided in indigenous languages, indigenous schools are typically of
lower quality than Spanish language schools, thereby making the opportunity cost of
work lower for indigenous children. This relationship between economic inclusion and
education, and the propensity to work can be seen in other variables as well—the likeli-
hood of working declines with the level of education in the household, as well as with
household wealth. Finally, in Table 5, the estimate of the correlation between the errors
of the two equations of the bivariate probit model, ρ12, is positive and significant,
Table 6 Treatment effect estimates of remittance receipt on propensity to work
Average treatment effect (ATE) Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)










Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
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indicating that unobserved factors contributing to an increase in propensity to remit
are also associated with an increase in the propensity of children to work and confirm-
ing that estimating the two equations separately would lead to biased results.
Given that the results above indicate different propensities to work between rural and
urban households, as well as between male and female children, the following section ex-
plores how remittances affect these groups differently. Table 6 presents the estimated treat-
ment effects of remittance receipt for urban and rural households and for male and female
children obtained by estimating the bivariate probit model separately for each group
(complete estimation results are presented in Tables 7 and 8). Despite large differences in
the propensity to work between boys and girls, the average treatment effects appear to be
fairly similar. However, the treatment effect on the treated is substantially larger for
females. Thus, it would appear that although boys are significantly more likely to work than
girls, remittance income tends to be directed toward reducing the labor effort of girls.
Comparison of the treatment effects between urban and rural households yields many
interesting results. First, the ATT is approximately 7 percentage points larger for urban
households than rural households. It is not entirely surprising that remittances are
more effective at reducing child labor in urban areas than rural areas. First, children
are significantly more likely to work in rural areas regardless of whether their house-
hold receives remittances. Second, if the child labor decision is a function of alternative
uses of the child’s time, e.g., going to school, there may be fewer options available in
rural areas. Finally, if child labor is determined by household labor demand (rather than
the need for income), labor market imperfections in rural areas can make hiring adult
wage labor more difficult in rural areas, thus increasing the need to compensate with
child labor.
Additionally, the ATT for both groups are quite large relative to the observed share
of children who report working. This would imply that although the observed differ-
ence between the share of children working in households that receive remittances and
those who do not is fairly small, under the counterfactual of no households receiving
remittances, these differences would be much larger. Thus, the observed differences
found in the summary statistics significantly underestimate the causal impact of remit-
tances on reducing the prevalence of child labor.
Perhaps the more striking result is the comparison between ATE and ATT for the
two groups. In urban households, the effect on the treated is four times as large as the
average treatment effect. This would suggest that urban households who opt to send
migrants abroad benefit much more than the average household would, i.e., that there
is positive selection into migration. However, this does not necessarily appear to be the
case for rural households, as the ATE and ATT are roughly equivalent, at an approxi-
mate 41 % reduction in the probability that a child will work. One possible explanation
might be a kinship effect that could exist in the rural areas. That is, if rural villages tend
to be made up largely of extended families or close knit indigenous populations, then
income and expenditure decisions might be made at the community level, rather than
the household, and benefits from remittance income might be spread across the entire
village. Whereas in urban areas, the population may be more segmented and remit-
tance income would remain contained among recipient households. Unfortunately, the
current data does not contain information on inter-household relationships, so this
hypothesis is not directly testable.
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6.2 Intensity of work
Table 9 presents coefficient estimates of Eq. 9, replacing the remittance and labor
supply indicator variables with measures of the value of weekly remittance income and
the number of hours worked per week, respectively, as described by Eqs. 13 and 14.
Column 1 reports estimates of a simple Tobit model. The coefficient is negative, but
not significant. Columns 2–4 report the results of instrumental variable models with
various levels of control for censoring in the dependent variables. Columns 2 and 3 are
Table 7 Bivariate probit estimates of propensity to work by gender, urban and rural households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys Girls Rural Urban
Remittance indicator −0.9338* −1.0764** −1.4099*** −1.3881**
(0.4032) (0.3446) (0.2174) (0.4722)
Age 0.1440*** 0.1041*** 0.1085*** 0.1332***
(0.0191) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0308)
Male 0.1666* 0.0588
(0.0805) (0.0904)
Household income per capita 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Poverty indicator −0.0012 −0.0758 0.2814* −0.4582***
(0.0964) (0.0983) (0.1153) (0.0901)
Rural 0.9665*** 0.8100***
(0.1039) (0.0909)
HH age 0.0033 0.0025 0.0061 0.0002
(0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0053)
HH female 0.0407 0.1686 0.0010 0.2568*
(0.1070) (0.1020) (0.0983) (0.1225)
HH married 0.0828 0.1417 0.2497*** −0.1414
(0.0785) (0.0772) (0.0725) (0.0749)
Max education −0.0229 −0.0098 0.0067 −0.0374**
(0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0122)
Children 0–5 0.0354 −0.0262 −0.0539 0.1333**
(0.0431) (0.0424) (0.0359) (0.0489)
Boys 6–17 0.0162 0.0534 −0.0270 0.1435***
(0.0398) (0.0410) (0.0376) (0.0421)
Girls 6–17 0.0701 0.1378*** 0.0278 0.2005***
(0.0400) (0.0360) (0.0375) (0.0384)
Spanish first language −0.6804*** −0.7856*** −0.6529*** −0.4461
(0.0986) (0.0981) (0.0753) (0.2624)
Wealth index −0.0660** −0.0763** −0.0793*** 0.0098
(0.0249) (0.0272) (0.0228) (0.0344)
Constant −2.2175*** −1.9548*** −1.5062*** −2.1299***
(0.2873) (0.3022) (0.2636) (0.3416)
Number 2758 2593 2036 3315
χ2 790.9926 766.8504 582.4423 396.2101
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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presented for mainly expository purposes, while column 4 is the preferred specification.
Column 2 presents the results of a 2SLS model. The coefficient estimate for remittance
income is negative and significant. However, since neither equation controls for censor-
ing, these estimates are likely to be biased. The 2SLS model is presented primarily for
the purpose of testing instrument validity. Results of Hansen’s J test are presented at
Table 8 First-stage/remittance equation estimates by gender, urban and rural households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys Girls Rural Urban
Age 0.0182 0.0040 −0.0012 0.0143
(0.0197) (0.0215) (0.0255) (0.0179)
Male 0.0044 0.1344
(0.1186) (0.0892)
Household income per capita −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0002 −0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Poverty indicator −0.1884 −0.2005 −0.0638 −0.2886**
(0.1080) (0.1117) (0.1362) (0.0898)
Rural −0.0776 0.1609
(0.1116) (0.1229)
HH age 0.0175*** 0.0159*** 0.0231*** 0.0131***
(0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0030)
HH female 0.3920*** 0.4120*** 0.3838** 0.4154***
(0.1003) (0.0990) (0.1215) (0.0874)
HH married −0.0152 −0.1750 −0.1432 −0.0921
(0.0916) (0.0907) (0.1091) (0.0789)
Max education 0.0179 −0.0096 0.0543*** −0.0114
(0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0156) (0.0114)
Children 0–5 0.0685 0.0084 0.0164 0.0859
(0.0462) (0.0559) (0.0500) (0.0480)
Boys 6–17 0.0547 −0.0651 −0.0865 0.0679
(0.0413) (0.0522) (0.0503) (0.0422)
Girls 6–17 0.0414 0.1145* −0.0392 0.1536***
(0.0456) (0.0458) (0.0583) (0.0395)
Spanish first language −0.0008 −0.0804 −0.1530 0.4972
(0.1312) (0.1363) (0.1060) (0.3403)
Wealth index −0.1554* −0.0453 −0.1776* −0.1326
(0.0649) (0.0643) (0.0880) (0.0733)
Share of households receiving remittances 5.6515*** 7.6036*** 10.6868*** 4.9584**
(1.4282) (1.4798) (2.3359) (1.9128)
Share*wealth 1.9761** 1.4407* 2.4640** 2.1800**
(0.6427) (0.6318) (0.8744) (0.7331)
Constant −3.1419*** −2.7499*** −3.4957*** −3.2247***
(0.3600) (0.3518) (0.4557) (0.4917)
ρ12 0.5911 0.6164* 1.0518*** 0.9456
(0.3042) (0.2560) (0.2271) (0.7980)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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the bottom of column 2. The p value of 0.1238 indicates that the null hypothesis can-
not be rejected and the instruments are valid. Additionally, results of the first stage,
presented in Table 10, show that factors determining remittance size have the same
relationship, in terms of sign and significance, as those determining the incidence of
remittance receipt. Column 3 presents results of the IV Tobit model. The coefficient is
much larger than those presented in the 2SLS model, indicating that a strong upward
Table 9 Estimation results of intensity of work, Ln(hours per week + 1), children age 7–13
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit 2SLS IV Tobit Bivariate Tobit
Ln(remittances + 1) −0.0365 −0.3103*** −2.0792*** −0.3456**
(0.0408) (0.0760) (0.5027) (0.1071)
Age 0.3576*** 0.0874*** 0.3646*** 0.3587***
(0.0336) (0.0093) (0.0428) (0.0340)
Male 0.3445* 0.1226** 0.4839* 0.3680*
(0.1625) (0.0469) (0.2117) (0.1646)
Household income per capita 0.0004** 0.0001** 0.0005** 0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Poverty indicator −0.0625 −0.0446 −0.5011 −0.1549
(0.1980) (0.0541) (0.2770) (0.2007)
Rural 2.7294*** 0.6771*** 2.7957*** 2.7262***
(0.1788) (0.0591) (0.2358) (0.1802)
HH age 0.0026 0.0068** 0.0345** 0.0073
(0.0061) (0.0021) (0.0113) (0.0064)
HH female 0.0730 0.1729** 1.1981** 0.2537
(0.1975) (0.0647) (0.3672) (0.2098)
HH married 0.2672 0.0425 0.0627 0.2314
(0.1526) (0.0415) (0.1964) (0.1531)
Max education −0.0503* −0.0024 −0.0518 −0.0501*
(0.0231) (0.0061) (0.0297) (0.0234)
Children 0–5 −0.0232 0.0149 0.0997 0.0002
(0.0792) (0.0242) (0.1034) (0.0801)
Boys 6–17 0.1231 0.0283 0.1756 0.1337
(0.0771) (0.0239) (0.0984) (0.0780)
Girls 6–17 0.2591*** 0.0778*** 0.4345*** 0.2897***
(0.0731) (0.0231) (0.1062) (0.0750)
Spanish first language −1.6864*** −0.8026*** −1.8707*** −1.7215***
(0.1705) (0.0723) (0.2272) (0.1740)
Wealth index −0.2374*** −0.0418** −0.0856 −0.2143***
(0.0466) (0.0151) (0.0689) (0.0480)
Constant −6.4294*** −0.2371 −6.9997*** −6.4940***
(0.5557) (0.1611) (0.7126) (0.5609)
Number 5351 5351 5351 5351
F 173.0204 86.0245
χ2 1302.5538 3056.4818
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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bias occurs when censoring in the labor supply equation is not controlled for. However,
the IV Tobit model does not account for censoring in the remittance receipt equation.
Column 4 presents results from the bivariate Tobit model, which controls for censoring
Table 10 First-stage/remittance equation estimates, children age 7–13
(3) (2) (4)
2SLS IV Tobit Bivariate Tobit
Age 0.0045 0.0047 0.1089
(0.013) (0.0128) (0.1495)
Male 0.0768 0.0780 0.9443
(0.0629) (0.0629) (0.7264)
Household income per capita 0.00004 0.00003 −0.0002
(0.00006) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Poverty indicator −0.2270*** −0.2275** −2.2450**
(0.0778) (0.0778) (0.7891)
Rural 0.0092 0.0116 0.2004
(0.0738) (0.0739) (0.8560)
HH age 0.0158*** 0.0159*** 0.1643***
(0.0158) (0.0030) (0.0235)
HH female 0.5226*** 0.5240*** 4.3580***
(0.0900) (0.0899) (0.6994)
HH married −0.0853 −0.0841 −0.8552
(0.0568) (0.0568) (0.6570)
Max education 0.0036 0.0044 0.0429
(0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0951)
Children 0–5 0.0540 0.0533 0.4179
(0.0304) (0.0303) (0.3613)
Boys 6–17 0.0177 0.0160 0.1049
(0.028) (0.0279) (0.3314)
Girls 6–17 0.0836*** 0.0830** 0.8643**
(0.031) (0.0309) (0.3315)
Spanish first language −0.0620 −0.0435 −0.4457
(0.0694) (0.0678) (0.9720)
Wealth index −0.1283*** −0.0996** −1.2015*
(0.0361) (0.0348) (0.4819)
Share of households receiving remittances 6.041*** 6.4682*** 66.4583***
(0.9084) (0.8758) (10.9832)
Share*wealth 2.102*** 1.7666*** 19.1313***
(0.413) (0.3816) (4.6627)




Hansen’s J statistic 2.369
p value 0.1238
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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in both equations. The coefficient of −0.35 indicates that a 10 % increase in remittance
income is associated with a 3.5 % decrease in the number of hours worked by children.
This result highlights the fact that in addition to remittances being effective at moving
some children completely out of the labor force, they can also help to reduce the bur-
den of labor on others, thus potentially freeing more time to devote toward human
capital accumulation.
Tables 11 and 12 presents estimates of the bivariate Tobit model for male and female
children, as well as rural and urban households. There does not appear to be a large
difference between the effects for male and female children. There does, however, ap-
pear to be a large difference between coefficient estimates for urban and rural house-
holds. Table 11 indicates for rural households a 10 % increase in weekly remittance
income is associated with a 7 % decrease in hours worked. For urban households, a
10 % increase in remittance income is associated with a 10.8 % decrease in hours
worked. While some of this discrepancy may be due to different economic conditions
in rural areas (labor market frictions, lack of alternative uses for child’s time, etc.), it is
worth noting that much of this result may also be driven by differences in the levels of
remittance income. Recall that the median remittance-receiving urban household re-
ceives 699 bolivianos (US$101), whereas the median rural household receives only 233
bolivianos (US$34). Thus, in absolute terms, a 10 % increase for an urban household is
nearly three times the amount of a rural household. To put it another way, for a child
working the mean number of hours per week, living in a household receiving the median
amount of remittances, it would take a 17.9 boliviano increase in remittance income to re-
duce their weekly employment by 1 h in a rural area, whereas it would take 26.16 bolivia-
nos in an urban household. When viewed in this way, the marginal effect of a remitted
boliviano is larger in rural areas. Furthermore, this also suggests that remittances ability to
reduce child labor may be diminishing as remittance income increases.
Many of the other variables found to impact the labor supply decision at the exten-
sive margins also carry through to the intensive margins. Children in rural households
work more hours per week than their urban counterparts. Boys work more hours per
week than girls, and older children work more than younger children. Children whose
first language is Spanish work significantly less than children from indigenous-language
households. Household education reduces the number of hours worked in urban
households, but not in rural households. Similarly, the number of children in the
household tends to increase the amount of work in urban households, but has no
significant effect in rural households.
7 Conclusions
The dramatic rise of remittances flowing to Bolivia in the past several years is undoubt-
edly affecting the economy in a number of ways. This study has explored how remit-
tances are affecting the prevalence and intensity of child labor. The results presented
above provide evidence that remittances can potentially be used to help reduce the
prevalence and extent of child labor in the country. Whereas previous research has
found that remittances can play a role in moving children out of the labor market, this
study also finds that remittances can significantly reduce the number of hours worked
by children who continue to engage in economic activity. While it may be preferable
that children not work at all, even a modest reduction in economic activity can free up
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time for children to increase their human capital and propel them onto a sustainable
path to lift themselves and future generations out of poverty and into a higher standard
of living.
While the findings suggest that remittances can lead to an across the board reduction
in child labor, the difference in magnitudes of the effect between urban and rural areas
indicates that remittances are more effective in some areas than others. In particular,
the findings above indicate that remittances are more effective at moving children
Table 11 Bivariate Tobit estimates of hours worked by gender, urban and rural households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys Girls Rural Urban
Ln(remittances + 1) −0.3619* −0.3828* −0.7038*** −1.0878*
(0.1471) (0.1546) (0.0499) (0.4502)
Age 0.4090*** 0.3091*** 0.2605*** 0.7861***
(0.0497) (0.0458) (0.0402) (0.0939)
Male 0.3826* 0.2710
(0.1838) (0.5159)
Household income per capita 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0001 0.0008**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Poverty indicator −0.0209 −0.3483 0.5829* −2.7517***
(0.2763) (0.2942) (0.2941) (0.5588)
Rural 2.9289*** 2.4878***
(0.2527) (0.2553)
HH age 0.0085 0.0067 0.0228** −0.0047
(0.0092) (0.0087) (0.0077) (0.0251)
HH female 0.0729 0.5071 0.2346 1.3522
(0.2972) (0.2933) (0.2378) (0.7940)
HH married 0.1473 0.3548 0.4647** −0.8779
(0.2152) (0.2159) (0.1758) (0.4511)
Max education −0.0678* −0.0325 0.0391 −0.2169**
(0.0330) (0.0328) (0.0279) (0.0698)
Children 0–5 0.0924 −0.0957 −0.0865 0.6800*
(0.1128) (0.1122) (0.0810) (0.3010)
Boys 6–17 0.0903 0.1825 −0.0503 0.8560***
(0.1088) (0.1127) (0.0913) (0.2353)
Girls 6–17 0.2075 0.3842*** 0.0505 1.1363***
(0.1099) (0.1018) (0.0886) (0.2580)
Spanish first language −1.5095*** −1.9637*** −1.4282*** −2.6289*
(0.2391) (0.2538) (0.1703) (1.1791)
Wealth index −0.1980** −0.2239** −0.1761** 0.0293
(0.0653) (0.0711) (0.0537) (0.1738)
Constant −6.7260*** −5.9101*** −3.7725*** −12.2943***
(0.7629) (0.8138) (0.6351) (2.3495)
Number 2758 2593 2036 3315
χ2 1569.4078 1579.3853 858.4691 411.7604
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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completely out of the labor market in urban areas than rural areas. At the same time,
after controlling for the initial level of remittance income and hours worked, the mar-
ginal impact of a remitted boliviano on the number of hours worked is larger in rural
areas than urban areas. This suggests that migration policy can play an important role
in addressing child labor in Bolivia, and that policy regimes should differ between rural
Table 12 Bivariate Tobit estimates, remittances equation by gender, urban and rural households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys Girls Rural Urban
Age 0.1885 0.0496 0.0670 0.1701
(0.1981) (0.2216) (0.2226) (0.1823)
Male 0.0489 1.2967
(1.0250) (0.9041)
Household income per capita −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0017 0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0005)
Poverty indicator −2.1848* −2.2761* 0.7878 −3.1085***
(1.0882) (1.1517) (1.3333) (0.9103)
Rural −0.8053 1.7174
(1.1290) (1.2616)
HH age 0.1728*** 0.1544*** 0.1927*** 0.1267***
(0.0302) (0.0363) (0.0341) (0.0307)
HH female 4.1826*** 4.4889*** 3.0631** 4.5613***
(0.9948) (0.9963) (1.1255) (0.8542)
HH married −0.1532 −1.7226 −0.5232 −0.8319
(0.9006) (0.9431) (0.9779) (0.8144)
Max education 0.1803 −0.1024 0.5475*** −0.1133
(0.1346) (0.1295) (0.1320) (0.1178)
Children 0–5 0.6790 0.0531 0.0052 0.8532
(0.4637) (0.5686) (0.4413) (0.4675)
Boys 6–17 0.6575 −0.6051 −0.9621* 0.7760
(0.4226) (0.5321) (0.4505) (0.4281)
Girls 6–17 0.4343 1.2362** −0.6108 1.6087***
(0.4625) (0.4714) (0.4899) (0.3886)
Spanish first language −0.2836 −0.8063 −3.1752*** 5.1546
(1.3428) (1.3997) (0.8889) (3.5112)
Wealth index −1.7588** −0.4324 −2.2230** −1.4578
(0.6521) (0.6794) (0.7024) (0.7888)
Share of households 59.1451*** 78.4058*** 123.3242*** 53.6113**
Receiving remittances (14.8499) (15.7588) (18.5647) (16.8350)
Share*wealth 22.0506*** 14.8830* 26.4385*** 23.5423**
(6.3731) (6.6495) (6.9854) (7.8643)
Constant −32.0373*** −28.6078*** −35.1037*** −33.9478***
(3.5546) (3.6442) (4.0603) (4.7715)
ρ12 0.3694* 0.3678* 1.2965*** 0.6923
(0.1633) (0.1577) (0.1113) (0.4437)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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and urban areas. In urban areas, the gains are larger when increasing the incidence of
remittances than increasing the size of remittances. As such, policies geared at encour-
aging more migration will likely have a more significant impact on reducing child labor.
The evidence presented above showed that reducing migration costs, as proxied by size of
migrant networks, can significantly increase the incidence of remittances. As such, pol-
icies aimed at reducing the costs of migration can be effective at encouraging migration.
Such policies could be monetary transfers, such as subsidizing travel expenses, but also
could be simply providing information about job opportunities abroad and assisting with
job placement. Additionally, rural areas benefit more from larger remittances than a
higher incidence of remittances. Given the high prevalence of child labor in rural areas, it
may be the case that labor market imperfections are preventing children from completely
leaving the labor force. In which case, policies aimed at encouraging more out-migration
may eventually serve to exacerbate the problem. Thus, policies geared toward increasing
the size of remittances, rather than the incidence, will have a larger impact in the fight
against child labor. Such policies may include increasing communications coverage in
rural areas and expanding access to financial institutions in order to facilitate transfers.
While increasing the flow of remittances is certainly not a panacea, the evidence
presented in this study indicates that it is at least one tool that can still be leveraged
to reduce not only the prevalence but also the intensity of child labor.
Endnotes
1Since most children contribute unpaid domestic labor, “wages” in this context refers
to an individual’s contribution to household consumption, and not necessarily monetary
compensation.
2The wealth index was created using the first principal component method, utilizing
variables for whether the household owned their home, the number of rooms in the
house, construction materials of the walls and floors of the home, whether the home
had running water, sanitation facilities, and electricity, whether household members
had phone and internet service, and whether the household had an oven, refrigerator,
computer, television, video player, video game, microwave, electric washer and dryer,
air-conditioning, and/or a personal vehicle.
3The results presented below are robust to expanding the upper bound to 16 years
old. These results are available upon request.
4This measure of child labor includes both formal and informal labor market activities,
but excludes domestic chores. The estimates of child labor activity are consistent with
findings by Zapata et al. (2011), who report 28.2 percent of children aged 7-14 worked in
market activities, and working children worked an average of 20.9 hours per week.
5Currency is converted at the official exchange rate of 6.94 BOB/US$ (World Bank,
2015).
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